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Abstract 
This paper studies two novel productivity characteristics of foreign acquisition on high-tech 
manufacturing firms: the dynamic and the non-Hicks-neutral effects. A dynamic productivity effect of 
foreign ownership arises when adoption of foreign technology and management practices takes time to 
fully realize. Furthermore, these dynamic adjustments may be capital or labor augmenting as adoption of 
advanced production technologies tends to have non-neutral productivity implications in developed 
countries. We propose and implement an econometric framework to estimate both effects using firm-
level data from China's manufacturing sector. Our framework extends the nonparametric productivity 
framework developed by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2020), in which identification is achieved using a 
firm's first-order conditions and timing assumptions. We find strong evidence of dynamic and non-
neutral effects from foreign ownership, with significant differences across investment sources. 
Investment from OECD sources is found to provide a long-term productivity boost for all but the largest 
recipients, while that from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan does not raise performance. These findings 
have implications for China's declining labor share and for the rising domestic value-added content of its 
high-tech exports. 
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1 Introduction
The impact of foreign ownership and foreign acquisition on domestic firms’ performance
has long been a central topic in empirical studies of globalization (see for example Aitken
and Harrison (1999), Javorcik (2004), Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007)). Contemporary
increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic manufacturing productivity, espe-
cially in China, have kept alive debate concerning causal links between these two observed
phenomena. Voluminous empirical work examining the relationship, however, has focused
mainly on short-term and Hicks-neutral effects of foreign investment on the production pro-
cesses of domestic firms. In this paper, we study two novel productivity effects of foreign
ownership and foreign acquisition on domestic firms’ production function: the dynamic and
the non-Hicks-neutral effects. The former captures the long-term gain or loss from for-
eign ownership, while the latter provides insight into the labor market impact of FDI-led
manufacturing growth. Our empirical context is China’s high-tech manufacturing sectors
from 1998-2007 and we allow for differential effects of foreign investment across investment
sources.
Dynamic productivity effects of foreign ownership arise because adoption of foreign tech-
nology and management practices often takes time to fully realize. To fix ideas, consider
a domestic firm that is acquired by a foreign partner with advanced technological capabil-
ity. Absorption of this technology by the acquired firm requires structural transformation
in both production and non-production processes. As this adjustment takes time, changes
in measured performance may not be fully realized immediately after the acquisition, but
accumulate gradually over a longer time horizon. Accounting for this dynamic adjustment
provides a more comprehensive picture of how foreign investment affects domestic firm pro-
ductivity.
Furthermore, since non-Hicks-neutral gains accrue from advanced production technologies
deployed in developed countries, which are often found to be capital or labor augmenting, the
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same technology may have similar effects in developing economies when being transferred
through foreign investment. Biased technological change is considered a leading cause of
many structural transformations in the labor markets of developed countries. For example,
Oberfield and Raval (2014) and Lawrence (2015) identify biased technological change as a
major factor in the secular decline of labor share in the US.1 If foreign investment carries
advanced foreign technology content, such investment acts as a firm-level technological shock
that alters the production function of recipient domestic firms, with potentially aggregate
implications for the host country.
In this paper, we propose a unifying econometric framework to estimate both the dynamic
and non-Hicks-neutral productivity effects of firm-level foreign investment. To achieve these
goals, we first include the foreign ownership status as an input choice in a nonparametric
production function. This allows us to identify the non-linear effects of foreign investment on
firms’ production function, permitting us to test for non-Hicks-neutral productivity effects.
Secondly, we also include the foreign acquisition variable (i.e. a switch) in the Markov
productivity process so that we can distinguish the productivity dynamic paths before and
after the major ownership change. Overall, our econometric framework extends a recent
nonparametric identification result for production function estimation proposed by Gandhi,
Navarro and Rivers (2020) (henceforth, GNR). The GNR method is distinguished from
other existing methods, such as Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), in that its identification exploits more information from
the optimizating behavior of firms rather than imposing a functional-form assumption on
production functions, enabling us to explore the full impact of foreign ownership on a firm’s
production process.
We apply this new framework to a panel dataset of Chinese high-tech manufacturing
firms from 1998-2007. During this period, along with other major reforms including state
1Recent evidence of biased technological change is also documented by Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2018) using panel data of Spanish manufacturing plants. More broadly, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)
document a global trend of declining labor share, not only in developed countries but also in developing
countries.
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enterprise restructuring and its 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, China expe-
rienced annual inflows of over $40 billion in foreign investment, almost all in manufacturing
industries.2 Contemporaneously, China’s manufacturing sectors sustained high rates of pro-
ductivity growth (Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012)). This provides an ideal context
to investigate the impacts of foreign investment on Chinese firms’ productivity.
Our analysis focuses on high-tech manufacturing because these are sectors where for-
eign partners likely have a technological advantage over Chinese domestic firms. We also
further explore the differential impacts of foreign investment based on origin: investment
from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (henceforth, OECD) mem-
ber countries versus that from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (henceforth, HKMT). This
empirical interest is motivated by recent evidence that HKMT firms are not more productive
than private domestic Chinese firms. Indeed, an unknown share of HKMT firms are actually
mainland Chinese firms that establish headquarters in neighboring locations to enjoy favor-
able tax treatment reserved for foreign investors (Du, Harrison and Jefferson (2012)). Our
analysis supports past findings that HKMT investment has different effects on productivity
as compared to OECD investment, and we are also able to compare the dynamics of these
impacts and their non-Hicks-neutral implications.
We offer three main results. First, in our baseline model, we show that foreign acquisition
of a Chinese private firm improves the target firm’s productivity in both the short and long
run. However, we find that the long-run effect is typically smaller than the short-run effect.
Furthermore, the long-run productivity effect varies significantly across firm sizes: larger
firms generally benefit from foreign ownership while smaller firms do not. Secondly, when
we distinguish foreign investment coming from HKMT versus OECD-member states, we
find no productivity premium relative to domestic ownership from HKMT acquisition, but
a larger than average premium from OECD firm ownership. Interestingly, the production
technology of HKMT-acquired firms, which manifests as output elasticities with respect
2Value obtained from Naughton (2006), figure 17.1. During this time period, foreign direct investment
inflows averaged between 3 and 4 percent of Chinese GDP.
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to production inputs, are remarkably similar to those of private domestic firms. Finally,
and importantly, we find strong evidence of non-Hicks-neutral impacts of OECD ownership
on China’s high-tech manufacturing sectors. In particular, we find that foreign technology
embedded in OECD investment has both labor- and capital-augmenting implications.
Foreign Ownership and Productivity
The relationship between foreign ownership and firm productivity has been studied exten-
sively in the literature. In most cases, researchers investigate the short-term and Hicks-
neutral productivity effects, and empirical results are mixed. For example, Djankov and
Hoekman (2000), Harris (2002), Harris and Robinson (2003), Conyon et al. (2002), Girma
and Gorg (2007), Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Girma et al. (2015) find that foreign-invested
firms (and foreign affiliates) have higher productivity than do their domestic counterparts.
In the case of foreign acquisition, foreign investment is found to boost the productivity of
domestic recipient firms. In constrast, other studies such as Griffith (1999), Benfratello
and Sembenelli (2006), Fons-Rosen et al. (2013), Wang and Wang (2015) find that foreign
ownership typically has no or a very small positive productivity effect post acquisition.
This paper introduces a new econometric framework for exploring the productivity im-
pacts of foreign acquisition, a contribution made evident by a brief review of prior empirical
approaches. The most common empirical strategy in recent studies is a two-stage approach
where in the first stage the researcher estimates a structural measure of firms performance
(i.e. total factor productivity (TFP)), while in the second stage the researcher combines
a difference-in-difference estimator with propensity score matching to identify an average
treatment effect of foreign ownership on firms performance. For instance, Arnold and Ja-
vorcik (2009) employ this strategy and find that foreign investment substantially improve
productivity of recipient plants in Indonesia, with an average effect of about 13.5% three
years after acquisition. Wang and Wang (2015) implement this strategy to study the effect
of foreign acquisition compared to domestic acquisition, finding no significant productivity
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advantage due to foreign equity participation. Girma and Gorg (2007) and Girma et al.
(2015) apply the same strategy to UK and Chinese manufacturing, respectively, and arrive
at similar qualitative conclusions. Most closely related to our paper, Kamal (2015) employs
this two-stage approach to compare productivity differences between HKMT and OECD-
owned firms in China and finds productivity premium of OECD owership. There are two
common underlying assumptions of these studies: (1) the productivity process is exogenous
with regard to the choice of foreign acquisition in the first-stage; and (2) the effect of for-
eign ownership is Hicks-neutral, meaning that it only affects the production function in a
linear manner. In contrast, our econometric model relaxes these assumptions and allows the
exploration of differences that are not feasible with previous empirical strategies.
Our Approach
Our econometric framework builds on a dynamic model of firm behavior introduced in the
productivity estimation literature. This model and its structural estimation have been de-
veloped by a series of papers including Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015) (henceforth, OP, LP and ACF, respectively) and Gandhi,
Navarro and Rivers (2020). Both the ACF and GNR methods draw insights from LP in that
the levels of static inputs are determined based on firms’ current realization of productiv-
ity and hence, contain information about this unobserved characteristic. These observed
static inputs can then be used to nonparametrically control for productivity. ACF com-
bines this information with a Leontief functional-form assumption to identify the production
function. GNR extracts information from static inputs taking a different angle. In addition
to using the levels of static inputs to control for productivity, GNR exploits static input
shares and the first order conditions to provide additional sources of information for identi-
fication. This source of additional information allows GNR to overcome the nonparametric
non-identification issue of the classic OP and LP approaches for the gross output production
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function.3
Our initial points of departure are papers by De Loecker (2013) and Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013), who extend productivity analysis to explore learning-by-exporting and
R&D, respectively.4 Most closely related to our paper is Chen et al. (2020) who extend
GNR’s nonparametric framework to study productivity dynamics of privatization in China.
GNR estimates a gross output production function and allows for flexible nonlinearities in
both production technology and productivity growth. Therefore, the GNR method serves
our purpose by making estimation of the dynamic and non-Hicks-neutral effects feasible.
Our identification is obtained by the firm’s first-order condition for profit maximization with
respect to material and by the timing assumptions of firm’s actions. We do not distinguish
between revenue productivity (denoted as TFPR) and physical productivity (TFP) as we
are interested in the general performance of firms, which might include firm-specific market
power as well.5
Our approach offers several advantages. First, by including the choice of foreign acqui-
sition and allowing this choice to affect future productivity through a Markov process, we
explicitly recover the productivity adjustment path of firms after the ownership change. This
allows us to compare short-term versus long-term effects of foreign ownership and foreign ac-
quisitions. Secondly, by estimating a nonparametric production function, we can account for
the full heterogeneity of the production function. This feature is particularly important since
even within a narrowly defined industry, firms with different ownership types and different
scales of production may exhibit substantial heterogeneity in production technology. Finally,
our framework is easily extendable to study other dimensions of ownership changes such as
distinguishing between source countries of foreign investment (OCED versus HKMT).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the institu-
3See also reviews of this non-identification issue provided by Bond and Söderbom (2005), Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazer (2015), Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2020).
4These extensions date back to Griliches (1979)’s knowledge capital model in the productivity literature.
5For a survey regarding the distinction between TFPR and TFP, see Loecker and Goldberg (2014). In
this paper, we use the term “productivity” to refer to firms’ overall performance.
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tional background of foreign investment in China’s manufacturing sectors from 1998-2007.
In section 3, we propose our empirical approach and estimation strategy. Section 4 details
our dataset. Section 5 presents and discusses our results, while section 6 draws broader
implications of our findings.
2 Foreign Investment in China from 1998-2007
Table 1 shows aggregate shares of firm and employment by ownership type in 1998 and
2007. Two clear trends can be seen from this table. The first trend is the rapid growth in
China’s private sector. In addition to robust entry of new firms, the Chinese government
pursued a substantial program of SOE reform, the implications of which are studied by
Chen et al. (2020). The second trend is a sharp increase in foreign investment in China’s
manufacturing sectors during this period, with the number of HKMT-owned firms almost
doubling while those with OECD investors tripling in number. The employment share of
foreign-invested firms increases markedly from 6.7% to 13% for HKMT firms and from 5% to
15% for OECD firms between 1998 and 2007. Taken together, the table has two important
implications. First, the number of foreign firms grows proportionally to the total number
of firms in China’s manufacturing during this sample period. Secondly, the scale of foreign
firms is larger than that of average domestic firms. In 2007, foreign activities, measured by
employment shares, account for almost 30% of Chinese manufacturing, highlighting their
importance in Chinese manufacturing sector during the sample period. These magnitudes
suggest that the impact of foreign investment on productivity is an important aspect of
China’s post-WTO-accession development.
The increase in economic activity of foreign firms reveals much more interesting patterns
in several particular industries. Figure 1 captures employment share of HKMT firms and
OECD firms in high-tech industries (henceforth, Tech). We define the Tech group to include
industries that involve relatively more sophisticated production processes. This group of in-
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dustries includes 2-digit manufacturing of: general-purpose machinery (35), special-purpose
machinery (36), transportation equipments (37), electrical machinery (39), communication
equipment and computers (40), and precision instruments (41). In the Tech group, the
share of foreign employment increases markedly from about 7% to 16% for HKMT firms and
from about 8% to 25% for OECD firms. Again, if one were to combine HKMT and OCED
firms into one category, this increase is steep and consequently by 2007, foreign employment
accounts for about 40% of the Tech industries. Another interesting pattern captured by
Figure 1 is that there is an abrupt surge in the employment share of OECD firms after 2003.
This surge is potentially due to a major overhaul of China’s FDI policy in 2002 following
China’s WTO accession giving preferences to the high-tech sectors.6
3 The Model
We start with an augmented model of a nonparametric production function. Consider the
following production function:
yit = f(kit, lit,mit, vit) + ωit + εit, (1)
where yit, kit, lit,mit are the natural logs of output (Yit), capital (Kit), labor (Lit), and mate-
rial (Mit) of firm i in year t. vit indicates the ownership status of the firm, whether domestic
(D) or foreign (F): 1 if Foreign (F)
vit = (2)0 if Domestic (D).
ωit measures productivity of the firm. We interpret this term as firm’s overall performance
rather than physical productivity in order to avoid the need to identify firm markups, which
is difficult in Chinese firm-level data due to the lack of firm-level price information. εit is
6See Lu, Tao and Zhu (2017) for a review of FDI policy in China.
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a random measurement error and fully exogenous. In this model, the indicator variable vit
captures fundamentally different technology (heterogeneity) between foreign firms (F) and
domestic firms (D). We treat this vit as an input into the production processes of firms and
allow it to be correlated with productivity ωit.
The second extended feature of this model is the Markov productivity process. Specifi-
cally, we consider the Markovian productivity:
ωit = h(ωi,t−1, dit) + ηit, (3)
where dit indicates if the firm switches ownership status from domestic to foreign between
the periods (t − 1) and t. If the firm’s ownership status changes, this indicator variable
equals 1. Otherwise, this indicator equals 0. In particular, dit is defined as:
7
1 if vi,t−1 = 0 and vit = 1
dit = (4)0 otherwise .
The function h(.), which captures the expected productivity of the firm at the beginning of
period t, is allowed to be nonparametric.
The structures in equations (1)-(4) combined allow us to capture the short-run and long-
run effects on productivity of firms due to ownership change. Here, we interpret vit as the
permanent shift in productivity trajectory between domestic and foreign firms. On the other
hand, dit captures the initial productivity shock of firms who switch ownership as compared
to firms who do not, conditioning on the same level of past productivity ωi,t−1. Though
we maintain the nonparametric specification for the production function f(.), we simply
suppose h(.) to be linear, which is a widely used specification in the productivity literature.
Specifically, we assume that the Markov productivity is a linear autoregressive of order one
7In the data, there are a few firms that switch ownership from foreign to domestic. Therefore, in principle,
we can include another indicator for this type of switch. However, these cases are very few and we exclude
domestic acquisitions in this study.
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(i.e., AR(1)) process given as:
ωit = ρωi,t−1 + γdit + ηit. (5)
When the Markov process is stationary (i.e. |ρ| < 1), the initial productivity shock will die
out over time.
Next, we follow the productivity literature in imposing the scalar unobservability as-
sumption:
mit = M(kit, lit, vit, ωit), (6)
where M(.) is strictly monotone in ωt, conditioning on all other inputs and state variables.
Intuitively, equation (6) implies that more productive firms use more material to produce
more output, conditioning on the same market environments and on all other inputs as
well as state variables such as ownership status.8 A direct result from this assumption is
that function M(.) can be inverted to nonparametrically control for productivity based on
observable inputs used:
ωit = M−1(kit, lit, vit,mit). (7)
We also need timing assumptions to identify our production function. The formal timing
assumptions follow GNR and Chen et al. (2020). We describe the timing of firm’s actions
as:
• At the end of period (t− 1), the firm chooses (kit, lit, vit) and whether to exit at t.
• At the beginning of period t, ηit (and hence ωit) realizes. The firm observes their
productivity for period t.
• The firm optimally chooses mit, after which εit realizes and completely determines yit.
8This assumption can be shown to hold under various market structures when firms solve a static
optimization problem with respect to material. See expositions of this assumption in Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003), Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2020).
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• At the end of period t, the firm chooses (ki,t+1, li,t+1, vi,t+1) and whether to exit at
(t+ 1), repeating the same process.
Based on this timing structure, we have classified inputs based on their information
sets. Specifically, we first assume that kit, lit and vit are dynamic inputs that belong to
the information set of the firm at the end of period (t− 1), which we denote as Ii,t−1. This
assumption creates exclusion restrictions between these dynamic inputs and the productivity
shock ηit as well as the random measurement error εit. Additionally, we assume that mit is
a static input that belongs to the information set in period t, which we denote as Iit, but
not Ii,t−1. This means that mit is allowed to be correlated with ηit. However, since mit is
not correlated with the random measurement error εit by construction, this creates another
exclusion restriction for us to identify the elasticity with respect to this input. Intuitively,
capital and labor are assumed to be sticky inputs: they take time to plan, implement and
go into actual production. On the other hand, firms are assumed to have full flexibility in
adjusting material corresponding to their temporal productivity shocks.
Dynamic Interpretation
It is important to clarify how we interpret the dynamics in our augmented model. As we
discussed above, the term vit is the foreign ownership status indicator and hence it captures
the heterogeneity in production technology between foreign-owned versus domestic firms.
More precisely, we specify that vit captures the permanent change in the production function
f(.) so that it can describe the permanent productivity shift for firms that switch ownership
from being purely domestic to having foreign equity participation (i.e., a permanent difference
between two long-run equilibrium levels). On the other hand, the term dit indicates the
moment of ownership change so that it captures the initial productivity shock on ωit. Under
the stationarity of ωit, this initial shock helps us to distinguish between the short-term and
the long-term productivity effects. The immediate productivity effect on firms switching
ownership status is reflected by the total effect from vit and dit, whereas the permanent
11
effect comes from vit only.
Interestingly, the productivity paths of firms after foreign acquisitions can vary depending
on the directions of the effects of vit and dit, and their relative magnitudes. For instance,
we suppose the marginal effects from foreign owndership are positive: ∂yit = ∂f > 0 in
∂vit ∂v
equation (1) and ∂ωit = γ > 0 in equation (5). When ωit is a stationary Markov process∂dit
with drift (i.e., |ρ| < 1 in equation (5)), then the ownership change yields overshooting in
the productivity at the initial phase (∂f + γ), but the long-run productivity effect from the
∂v
ownership change after the tth period is ∂f +γρt, which becomes ∂f as the time after foreign
∂v ∂v
acquisition t → ∞. Figure 2 depicts possible productivity shock trajectories solely from
foreign acquisitions when 0 < ρ < 1. From this figure, we can predict how ownership status
change affects the firm’s productivity over time once we estimate the marginal effects ∂yit
∂vit
and ∂ωit .
∂dit
Non-Hicks-neutral Effects
We now distinguish between Hicks-neutral and non-Hicks-neutral effects. In our framework,
the effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-neutral if and only if the production function in
equation (1) can be rewritten in the following form:
yit = f1(kit, lit,mit) + f2(vit) + ωit + εit. (8)
In other words, the productivity effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-neutral if and only if
production function f(.) is additively separable between the main inputs (kit, lit,mit) and
the ownership indicator vit. An implication of the specification in equation (8) is that the
elasticities with respect to capital, labor, material, i.e., ∂f1(.) , ∂f1(.) , ∂f1(.) , are not functions
∂k ∂l ∂m
of ownership, vit. Importantly, since the specification in equation (8) is nested within our
nonparametric model in equation (1), we can test for the additive separability of vit in
the production function by comparing our estimated elasticities under two counterfactual
12
scenarios: when vit = 1 versus when vit = 0. If the effect of foreign ownership is Hicks-
neutral, elasticities with respect to other inputs should remains the same whether vit = 1 or
0.9
Figure 3 depicts the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between two factors
X and Y , where X, Y ∈ {K,L,M}, under two counterfactual scenarios: vit = 1 verus vit = 0,
and under the assumption that the effect of foreign ownership is not Hicks-neutral. In this
figure, when a firm has foreign ownership (vit = 1), MRTSXY is larger as compared to the
case where the same firm is domestically owned (vit = 0), conditioning on the same input mix
of X and Y (MRTS ∂f ∂f Y 10XY = / × ). In this case, foreign ownership has X-augmenting∂x ∂y X
technology implications (relative to Y ) and effectively increases the share of X (relative to
Y ) in total output derived from the production function.
Estimation Method
We follow the nonparametric identification and the two-stage estimation procedure by Gandhi,
Navarro and Rivers (2020). In the first stage, we estimate the partial derivative of f(.) with
respect to mit. In the second stage, we integrate this partial derivative and recover the
production function by combining it with the Markov productivity process.
The first stage makes use of the first order condition (FOC) of the firm’s profit max-
imization problem. Firm i maximizes its profit at the period t with respect to material
Mit:
maxPtE [exp (f (kit, lit,mit, vit) + ωit + εit) |Iit]− ptMit, (9)
Mit
where Iit denotes the firm’s information set at the beginning of t. Pt and pt are respectively
prices of output and material which the firm takes as given. Since Mit does not have any
dynamic implications and only affects current period profits, the FOC of this problem gives
9Furthermore, we can compute the labor share, capital share and material share in a counterfactual
exercise where we remove all the foreign investment in China’s manufacturing sector in our sample period.
10Here lowercase x and y are the natural logs of X and Y . Therefore, MRTSXY =
MPX = ∂F / ∂F =MPY ∂X ∂Y
(∂f × F )/(∂f × F ) = ∂f /∂f × Y .∂x X ∂y Y ∂x ∂y X
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us:
∂ exp (f (kit, lit,mit, vit))
Pt exp (ωit) E − pt = 0, (10)
∂Mit
where E ≡E [exp (εit) |Iit] = E [exp (εit)].
Taking the log and differencing with the production function Yit = exp (f (kit, lit,mit, vit))
× exp (ωit + εit) in equation (1), we get:
ptMit
log sit ≡ log
PtYit
∂
= log E + log f (kit, lit,mit, vit)− εit
∂mit
≡ logDE (kit, lit,mit, vit)− εit. (11)
In equation (11), sit denotes the material share of total revenue which we can obtain di-
rectly from the firm-level data. Intuitively, it implies that material share is informative
about the elasticity of output with respect to material in firm’s production function, i.e.,
∂ f (kit, l
∂
it,mit, vit). From Theorem 2 of GNR, we can identify f (kit, lit,mit, vit) as∂mit ∂mit
∂ DE (kit, lit,mit, vit)
f (kit, lit,mit, vit) = , (12)
∂mit E
[ ]
where E =E sit/DE (kit, lit,mit, vit) . For estimation, we approximate logDE (.) by the
second-order polynomial sieves and solve the following least squares problem:
{ }∑∑ ∑ ∑ 2n T
min log s − θ − θ kjk ljlmjmv − θ jk jl jmit 0 1,jk,jl,jm it it it it 2,jk,jl,jmkit litmit
θ
i=1 t=1 0≤jk+jl+jm≤1 1≤jk+jl+jm≤2
(13)
for jk, jl, jm ∈ {0, 1, 2}, where θ denotes all the unknown parameters. Note that we exclude
the v2it term since vit is binary.
In the second stage, we first numerically integrate ∂ f (kit, lit,mit, vit) to recover the∂mit
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production function f(.) up to a constant addition C(.) as a function of kit, lit, and vit:
∫
∂
f (kit, lit,mit, vit) dmit = f (kit, lit,mit, vit) + C (kit, lit, vit) . (14)
∂mit
Replacing f(.) with its original form in equation (1), we have
∫
∂
Ψit ≡ yit − εit − f (kit, lit,mit, vit) dmit
∂mit
= −C (kit, lit, vit) + ωit (15)
and combining with the Markov process expression of ωit in equation (5), we have
Ψit + C (kit, lit, vit) = ρ {Ψit−1 + C (kit−1, lit−1, vit−1)}+ γdit + ηit (16)
or
Ψit = −C (kit, lit, vit) + ρΨit−1 + ρC (kit−1, lit−1, vit−1) + γdit + ηit. (17)
Making use of the exclusion restrictions described above, equation (17) is fully indentified,
in the sense that E[ηit|C(kit, lit, vit), C(kit−1, lit−1, vit−1), dit,Ψit−1] = 0.
For estimation, once we solve equation (13), we obtain
∫
∂ˆ ˆΨit = yit − ε̂it − f (kit, lit,mit, vit) dmit (18)
∂mit
− ˆ E
∑ ∑
Êwith ε̂it = log sit logD (kit, lit,mit, vit), = (nT )−1 n Ti=1 t=1 exp(ε̂it), and
∫
∂
f̂ (kit, lit,mit, vit) dmit∫∂mit
1 ˆ= DE (kit, lit,mit, vit) dmit (19)
Ê { }
ˆ1 ∑ θ̂ ∑ θˆ 1,j ,j ,j= θ0mit − k l m 2,j ,j ,jkjk jl jm+1 k l m jk jl jm+1ˆ j + 1 it litmit vit − k l mj + 1 it it it .E m m0≤jk+jl+jm≤1 1≤jk+jl+jm≤2
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We approximate C (kit, lit, vit) by the second-order polynomial sieves as
∑ ∑
C (kit, lit, vit) ≈ β0 + β1,jk,jlk
jk
it l
jl
itvit + β2,jk,jlk
jk
it l
jl
it (20)
0≤jk+jl≤1 1≤jk+jl≤2
for jk, jl ∈ {0, 1, 2} and we run GMM estimation based on the following moment conditions:
E [ηit] = 0,
E [ηitΨit−1] = 0,
E [ηitdit] = 0, (21)[
E ηitkjkit l
j
]
l
it = 0 for 1 ≤ jk + jl ≤ 2 and jk, jl ∈ {0, 1, 2},[
j j
]
E ηitk kit l litvit = 0 for 0 ≤ jk + jl ≤ 1 and jk, jl ∈ {0, 1}.
ˆFrom equation (14), the production function estimate f(kit, lit,mit, vit) is obtained by
subtracting the estimated (20) from (19). In addition, estimated elasticities can be readily
calculated since equations (19) and (20) are in polynomial forms.
4 Data
Our data are drawn from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises (ASIE) in China
from 1998 to 2007. This is a panel survey data covering all industrial firms with sales
above 5 million Renminbi (RMB). The survey encompasses more than 90% of industrial
activities in China. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes aggregate statistics of this panel
dataset by year, which matches the official published data from the Chinese government and
ensures the quality of our dataset. We follow Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2012) and
Brandt, Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014) in basic data cleaning procedures and in constructing
our capital stock series using the perpetual inventory method.11 Our foreign ownership
11For basic cleaning procedures, we drop all firms with missing or negative values of the main variables,
including revenue, fixed assets, employment, material, and wage-bill. We drop all firms that employ fewer
than 8 workers. Real capital stocks are constructed based on procedures as specified in Brandt, Biesebroeck
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definitions are based on the official registration types recorded in the dataset. The official
threshold of foreign capital share to be categorized as foreign ownership is 25%. In our
dataset however, more than 75% of foreign firms have a foreign capital share above 30%.
As previously mentioned, our empirical applications focus on the designated high-tech
industries in China. Therefore, we keep only a sample of six 2-digit industries, including:
general-purpose machinery (35), special-purpose machinery (36), transportation equipment
(37), electrical machinery (39), communication equipment and computers (40) and precision
instruments (41). Since we are mainly interested in comparing foreign-owned firms with
private domestic firms, we drop all the observations that are registered as state-owned enter-
prises (SOE).12 We drop all firms that switch their ownership status back and forth between
domestic and foreign more than once in the panel. There are 70 firms belong to this category
from the raw data. Outliers in terms of capital, labor, material and material share are also
excluded from our sample (outside of the corresponding 1st and 99th percentiles). These
procedures leave us with 126, 387 panels spanning the 10-year period. Roughly 25% of total
firm-year observations are registered as foreign firms and 75% are registered as domestic
firms.
A firm is identified as switching from domestic to foreign-owned in period t if it is reg-
istered as (domestically) privately-owned in period t − 1 and as foreign-owned in period t.
Since our data allow us to further classify foreign-owned firms into HKMT versus OECD-
owned, a (domestically) privately-owned firm in period t − 1 is indentified as switching to
HKMT-type if it is HKMT-owned in period t, and as OECD-type if it is OECD-owned in
period t. During our sample period, a total of 2, 192 firms switch ownership status from
domestic to foreign, in which 1, 079 firms switch to HKMT-type and 1, 113 firms switch to
OECD-type. Overall, the number of switchers is small relative to the entire sample size,
yet it is enough to identify the dynamic effects of a change in foreign ownership status on
and Zhang (2014).
12Our identification exploits the profit-maximizing behavior of firms, thus it is more plausible to compare
private domestic with foreign-owned firms. Furthermore, there are very few transitions between SOE firms
and foreign firms in our sample period.
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productivity.
5 Results
Baseline
In the baseline specification, we combine HKMT and OCED firms, and treat them as one
common type of foreign firms which share the same technology. Figure 4 describes the rela-
ˆtionship between mean output f(.) and production inputs. There are two notable patterns
from Figure 4. First, conditioning on the same amount of labor used, foreign firms produce
more output compared to private domestic firms. Nevertheless, such a premium disappears
when conditioning on capital and material. Our estimation thus suggests that technology
associated with foreign ownership manifests as labor-augmenting technology (i.e., vit primar-
ily interacts with lit). Secondly, in the first graph, foreign dominance in labor production
appears to be largest among firms of middle size. For some of the largest firms, such dom-
inance is not evident, implying that large domestic firms are technologically comparable to
foreign firms.
Column 1 in Table 2 reports our estimates of the mean elasticities with respect to each
input and the parameters of the Markov process. Overall, our model delivers reasonable
estimates of mean elasticities with respect to capital, labor and material. The ratio of the
capital over labor elasticity is close to 1, reflecting the relatively capital intensive nature of the
Tech industries.13 We note that even though we do not impose any parametric assumptions
on production function, the estimated mean elasticity of material is about 0.725, suggesting
that the true production function differs from that of the Leontief form.14
In our baseline specification, we find that the mean effect of v is zero, which we interpret
13We estimate our model for the textile-related industries and find a much lower ratio. For Textiles (17),
this ratio is 0.75. For Garments (18) and Leather (19), this ratio is 0.5. More results regarding these sectors
are available upon request.
14An implication of this result is that the use of a value-added production function cannot generally be
justified.
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as evidence against a long-term effect on productivity of changing ownership status from
domestic to foreign. The coefficient for d is positive and significant, suggesting a strong
initial positive productivity shock to firms who switch ownership status. In particular,
firms that switch ownership status have on average a 2.6% short-term productivity effect as
compared to firms who do not, subject to the same Markov process and past productivity
ωi,t−1. This is consistent with the previous literature, which documents the existence of
positive productivity shock of foreign acquisition.
Since we consider a nonparametric production function, we can further recover hetero-
geneity of the productivity effects. Based on the estimated marginal effects of v and d, panel
(a) in Figure 5 depicts the productivity dynamics of our baseline model for all the foreign
firms (i.e., both HKMT and OECD firms) as in Figure 2. Figure 6 depicts the densities
of long-term and short-term productivity effects of all the domestic firms after the foreign
acquisition. We can see that the mode of short-term effects is positive whereas that of
long-term effects is negative. It suggests that most domestic firms have some short-term
productivity premium after foreign acquisition, though this premium disappears over time
and hence the evidence of long-term premium is weak. However, both of them are slightly
skewed to the right, which implies that there exist firms with large positive productivity
effects both in short term and long term.
Figure 7 shows how the long-term and short-term productivity effects are related to
the firm size, measured by log of employment. They show that for firms of smaller size
(log(L) ≤ 6), the long-term effect of foreign ownership is negative, implying that their
production processes do not interact well with foreign technology. On the other hand, firms of
larger size benefit substantially from foreign ownership. The long-term productivity premium
for these firms is as large as about 10%. One potential explanation for such heterogeneity
is that larger firms often have better absorptive capacity, and hence are better equipped to
take advantage of foreign technology and management practices. This result resonates the
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recent findings by Fons-Rosen et al. (2018).15 For the short-run effect, our model predicts
that all firms generate some productivity gains from foreign ownership, with gains ranging
from 2% to 13%.
In sum, from our baseline specification which combines all the HKMT and OECD firms
as one type, we show that the long-term effect of foreign investment is small on average and
substantially heterogenous across firm sizes. On the other hand, we find robust evidence
of a strong positive initial productivity shock when firms switch from domestic to foreign
ownership status.
HKMT versus OECD Ownership
As noted in Section 1, some evidence suggests that HKMT firms are in fact mainland Chinese
firms, yet they establish their headquarters in offshore locations to access favorable policies
for foreign investments. If this is the case, unlike OECD ownership, HKMT ownership should
not bring more productivity gain to recipient firms as compared to other private domestic
firms with comparable characteristics. To examine this hypothesis and demonstrate the
usefulness of our framework, we extend the baseline model by separating HKMT ownership
from OECD ownership and compare their technology as well as productivity changes after
acquisitions.
Specifically, we allow HKMT firms to behave differently than OECD firms by incorpo-
rating separate dummies for these two types of firms. The extended model is specified as
follow:
yit = f(kit, lit,mit, v
HKMT
it , v
OECD
it ) + ωit + εit (22)
with Markov productivity process:
ωit = ρωi,t−1 + γ1d
HKMT
it + γ2d
OECD
it + ηit (23)
15Specifically, they find that FDI only benefits domestic firms that share similar technology to foreign
firms, even though in their context, the productivity effects occur through horizontal spillovers rather than
direct transfers of technology through foreign ownership as in this paper.
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We report results for this extension in column 2 of Table 2 and in Figures 8-10. Strikingly,
as illustrated in Figure 8, we find that HKMT firms’ production technology and productivity
are almost identical to private domestic firms. In contrast, the estimated productivity pre-
mium of OECD firms as compared to domestic firms is now much larger than in the baseline
model. As in the baseline case, the labor productivity dominance of OECD as compared to
HKMT and domestic firms disappears for very large firms.
Column 2 of Table 2 shows that HKMT firms have negative long-term productivity effect
from foreign investment, while OECD firms have positive long-term effect. Therefore, foreign
acquisition makes HKMT firms perform worse than domestic firms in the long-run, if other
things are equal. There are positive initial productivity shocks among firms who switch
their ownership status to either HKMT or OECD type, although the productivity shock is
stronger for OECD acquisitions. Firms that switch to HKMT ownership have an estimated
1.8% productivity shock and firms that switch to OECD ownership have an estimated 3.7%
productivity shock compared to firms that do not switch. Based on the estimated marginal
effects of v and d, panels (b) and (c) in Figure 5 depict the productivity dynamics of the
OECD and HKMT firms, respectively, as in Figure 2, where we have ρ̂ of about 0.9 for all
the cases.
The positive productivity shock of OECD firms becomes more apparent when it is dis-
entangled from that of HKMT firms. Figure 9 shows the distributions of the short-term
and long-term productivity effects from foreign ownership similar to Figure 6. We can eas-
ily see the difference between foreign ownership types: the distribution of HKMT effects is
primarily negative, while the distribution of OECD effects is mainly positive. Figure 10 illus-
trates the long-term and short-term effects with respect to firm size as in Figure 7. The top
two panels show that HMKT firms are mostly less productive than private domestic firms,
and that a switch to HKMT type will not generate productivity gains either for short-term
or long-term. In contrast, the bottom panels of Figure 10 demonstrate strong patterns of
both short-term and long-term productivity gains for firms receiving investment from OECD
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sources. The long-term effect ranges from 2% to more than 5%, while the short-term effect
ranges from 5% to above 10%. As for the baseline case, this productivity gain is largest for
the moderately sized firm. However, even for OECD investment, the foreign productivity
gain mostly disappears for firms of very large size (log(L) close to 10 in this case).
Non-Hicks-neutral Implications
After estimating the model, we can compute the counterfactual elasticities of each firm and
examine the non-Hicks-neutral implications of foreign ownership. We can then obtain the
distributions of these elasticities with respect to labor, capital and material. Recall that
if the foreign ownership productivity effect is neutral, these distributions should not be
statistically different under vit = 1 versus vit = 0. To test for non-neutrality, Table 3 shows
our simple paired t-test for these elasticities between OECD firms versus domestic firms that
we estimated in (22).
Table 3 shows that OECD firms have higher product elasticity with respect to labor and
capital on average compared to domestic firms. On the other hand, OECD firms have lower
product elasticity with respect to material on average. The differences are all statistically
significant. These results imply that foreign technology involves more labor and capital but
less material.16 Table 4 compares the elasticity ratios of labor and capital, taking material
as a normalized input. As we hold the input ratios fixed for each firm, differences in these
elasticity ratios essentially reflect differences in MRTS, which directly maps to input factor
shares. Table 4 shows that OECD firms have higher MRTS than domestic firms. Ceteris
paribus, this implies that labor share and capital share of total output are higher in OECD
firms as compared to domestic firms. However, since the magnitude of difference is larger
for capital, capital-augmenting technology dominates labor-augmenting technology among
OECD firms. These facts combined deliver two implications: (1) value-added share of total
16Furthermore, if we impose constant return to scale (CRS) assumption on the physical production
function, we can infer markups induced by different ownership status. Table 3 shows that having OECD
ownership increases firms’ markups.
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revenue increases and (2) labor share of total value-added decreases (relative to capital share)
due to foreign ownership.
We calculate (average) counterfactual value-added (V A) shares of total revenue and labor
shares of total value-added as follow. First, since V A = R− pMM and pMM = ∂f , we have:R ∂m
V A pMM ∂f
log( ) = log(1− ) = log(1− ). (24)
R R ∂m
As a result, difference in the natural logs of value-added shares translates directly to the
difference in the natural logs of (1− ∂f ) under two counterfactuals (vit = 1 versus vit = 0).∂m
Secondly, using similar arguments, we could also compute the difference in the natural logs
of labor share of total value-added as follow:
wL wL R wL R
log( ) = log( ) = log( ) + log( ) (25)
V A R V A R V A
∂f ∂f
= log( )− log(1− ).
∂l ∂m
Here, w denotes the wage paid to workers.17 Based on our estimates of ∂f and ∂f , equations
∂l ∂m
(24)-(25) allow us to compute average counterfactual value-added share of total revenue and
labor share of total value-added. Plugging in the mean values of our estimated elasticities
from Table 3, equation (24) suggests that OECD ownership increases value-added share of
total revenue by 11.78%. On the other hand, equation (25) suggests that OECD ownership
decreases labor share of total value-added by 7.97%.
Our evidence suggests that foreign investment is non-Hicks-neutral biased and may have
contributed substantively to the decline of Chinese manufacturing labor share during this
sample period. Biased technological change introduced by foreign investment into China’s
high-tech manufacturing may also help to explain the observed growth in the domestic value-
17An underlying assumption in equation (25) is that, without any endogenous form of labor market
distortion, labor share of total revenue can be approximated by the revenue elasticity with respect to labor
i.e. wL = ∂f .R ∂l
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added share of Chinese high-tech exports.18 As noted above, our estimates imply that foreign
technology involves more labor and capital inputs relative to material. Foreign-invested
firms were expanding presence in China’s high-tech sector during our sample period: their
share of total high-tech sales rose from 27.5% in 1995 to 44% in 2005. By 2005, foreign-
invested firms provided almost two-thirds of China’s total high-tech export value.19 Because
foreign technology raises the contribution of domestic labor relative to imported materials,
foreign investment may have contributed to the rising domestic value-added share in high-
tech exports.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the dynamic and non-Hicks-neutral productivity effects of foreign
ownership in China’s high-tech manufacturing industries from 1998-2007. To this end, we
propose an econometric framework that extends a recent nonparametric productivity analysis
by Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers (2020). We include a foreign ownership variable in the pro-
duction function as well as an acquisition choice variable in the productivity dynamics. Our
approach enables us to recover the productivity adjustment path after foreign acquisitions
to distinguish short-term and long-term effects, and to study the bias of foreign technology
embedded in foreign ownership.
We find that foreign ownership brings both short-term and long-term productivity gains
in general, although the long-term effect is smaller than the short-term effect. This is mostly
the result of positive productivity shock upon foreign acquisitions. We also find that these
effects display substantial heterogeneity across firm sizes. Domestic medium-sized enterprises
gain the most from access to foreign investment, while the largest firms see no productivity
18According to the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added Project, in 1995 around three-quarters of the
total value of China’s information and computer technology exports reflected foreign content but by 2011
this had fallen to just over half, with similar large declines seen in other high-tech sectors, such as electrical
machinery and transport equipment. See https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/tiva/CN 2015 China.pdf.
19Characteristics of the high-tech sector for 1995 are drawn from Huang (2003), Table 1.4, which is based
on data from China’s Third Industrial Census. Comparable numbers for 2005 are calculated by the authors
from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, which is described in the text.
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boost.
Finally, in the context of China, our empirical analysis demonstrates that HKMT own-
ership does not bring productivity gain in the long run compared to their domestic coun-
terparts and only OECD acquisition delivers persistent productivity premia. Comparing
OECD-invested firms with domestic firms, we find that OECD technology is biased, mean-
ing that it is both labor- and capital-augmenting. Thus, the foreign-investment productivity
boost raises the marginal products of capital and labor relative to materials. This factor bias
may offer further insights into China’s falling labor share and rising domestic valued-added
in high-tech exports.
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Figure 1: Employment Share of HKMT and OECD Firms from 1998 -2007 within Tech Indus-
tries
Note: The Tech group comprises 2-digit manufacturing of: general-purpose machinery (35), special-
purpose machinery (36), transportation equipments (37), electrical machinery (39), communication
equipments and computers (40) and precision instruments (41).
Source: The figure is based on authors’ calculations using Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises
(ASIE).
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Figure 2: Productivity Change after Foreign Acquisition (When 0 < ρ < 1)
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Case 3: ∂f∂v < 0
∂fNote: The graphs illustrate three cases depending on the sign of , which determines the magnitude∂v
of the long-run productivity effect. For each case, there are three potential productivity paths (A),
(B) and (C) corresponding to the sign of γ. (A) corresponds to γ > 0. (B) corresponds to γ = 0. (C)
corresponds to γ < 0.
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Figure 3: Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution (MRTS) under Factor Biased Counterfac-
tuals
X
Y
X∗
Y ∗
vit = 0
vit = 1
Note: The figure illustrates the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) between two factors
X and Y under the assumption that foreign acquisition (vit = 1) is not Hicks-neutral when compared
to domestic ownership (vit = 0).
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ˆFigure 4: Mean f(.) against Primary Inputs for Foreign versus Domestic Ownership in Tech Industries
ˆNote: The figures illustrate the relationship between mean output f(.) and (log) primary inputs, labor, capital and material respectively, for
ˆforeign and domestic firms. In the first graph, at each given level of (log) labor l, each red point is obtained by averaging f(l, kit,mit, vit) for
ˆall i and i with vit = 1; each blue point is obtained by averaging f(l, kit,mit, vit) for all i and i with vit = 0. The second and the third graphs
are obtained in the same way, but at given (log) capital and (log) material, respectively. For each i and t, f(.) is estimated as described in
Section 3.
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Figure 5: Predicted Productivity Change after Foreign Acquisition
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Figure 6: Distribution of Short-term and Long-term Productivity Effects of Firms Switching
Ownership Status
Note: The figures illustrate the distribution of short-term (left panel) and long-term (right panel)
effects for firms switching ownership status from domestic (vit = 0) to foreign (vit = 1). Effects are
measured in percentage points.
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Figure 7: Productivity Effects by Firm Size (in Log Employment)
Note: The figures illustrate the heterogeneity of short-term (left panel) and long-term (right panel)
estimated effects based on firm size (measured in log employment). The right graph is obtained by
ˆ
nonparametric regression of the long-term effect estimates ∂f on log employment for all i and t. The∂v
left graph is a vertical shift of it by the size of short-term effect estimate γ̂.
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ˆFigure 8: Mean f(.) against Primary Inputs for OECD, HKMT and Domestic Firms in Tech Industries
ˆNote: The figures illustrate the relationship between mean output f(.) and (log) primary inputs, labor, capital and material respectively,
for OECD, HKMT and domestic firms. Each graph is obtained as Figure 4 based on the extended model in equations (22)-(23).
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Figure 9: Distribution of Short-term and Long-term Productivity Effects of Firms Switching
Ownership Status (HKMT versus OECD)
Note: The figures illustrate the estimated distribution of short-term (left panel) and long-term (right
panel) effects for firms switching ownership status from domestic to HKMT or OECD firms. Effects
are measured in percentage points.
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Figure 10: Productivity Effects by Firm Size for HKMT (Top) and OECD (Bottom) Invest-
ments
Note: The figures illustrate the heterogeneity of short-term (left) and long-term (right) estimated
effects based on firm size (measured in log employment). The graphs are obtained by nonparametric
regressions as in Figure 7. The top panels illustrate short-term and long-term effects for HKMT firms.
The bottom panels illustrate short-term and long-term effects for OECD firms.
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Table 1: Firms and Employment by Ownership Category in 1998 and 2007
Ownership Number of Firms Employment
—————————————– ————————————–
No.98 Pct98 No.07 Pct07 No.98 Pct98 No.07 Pct07
SOE 39,477 33 9,463 3.6 27 57 11 17
Hybrid/Collective 42,297 35 32,414 12 11 24 10 16
Private 18,770 16 170,888 66 3.3 7.1 24 39
Foreign - HKMT 11,480 9.5 22,164 8.5 3.2 6.7 8.2 13
Foreign - OECD 8,228 6.8 25,753 9.9 2.3 5 9.5 15
Total 120,252 100 260,682 100 47 100 63 100
Note: The foreign equity threshold is 25% for both HKMT and OECD firms.
Source: The table is based on authors’ calculations using Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises
(ASIE).
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Table 2: The Model Estimates for Tech Industries
Mean Elasticities and Estimated Parameters GNR1 GNR2
(Baseline) (HKMT vs OECD)
∂f/∂k 0.091 0.090
∂f/∂l 0.105 0.106
∂f/∂m 0.725 0.725
∂f/∂v -0.000 .
HKMT∂f/∂v . -0.035
OECD∂f/∂v . 0.025
∂ω/∂d ≡ γ
∂ω/∂dHKMT ≡ γ1
∂ω/∂dOECD ≡ γ2
0.026∗∗∗
(4.67)
.
.
.
0.018∗∗∗
(2.58)
0.037∗∗∗
(5.42)
∂f/∂v + γ 0.026 .
HKMT∂f/∂v + γ1 . -0.017
OECD∂f/∂v + γ2 . 0.063
ρ 0.895 0.899
Note: Bootstrap t-statistics are reported in brackets. Estimates without t-statistics are the means of
their respective elasticities over i and t.
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Table 3: Paired t-test for Differences between Counterfactual Elasticities (OECD)
Paired t-test N Mean (vit = 1) Mean (vit = 0) Difference p-value
Labor Elasticity
Capital Elasticity
Material Elasticity
424610
424610
424610
0.107
0.102
0.658
0.104
0.088
0.696
0.003
0.013
-0.038
0.000
0.000
0.000
(Revenue) Return to Scale 0.867 0.888
Markup 15.34 % 12.61 %
Note: The table shows paired t-test results for elasticities computed for every firms in the sample
under two counterfactuals: vit = 1 versus vit = 0. (Revenue) return to scale is sum of mean elasticities.
Markups are inferred under the assumption of constant return to scale of physical production.
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Table 4: Paired t-test for Elasticity Ratios under Factor Bias Counterfactuals (OECD)
Paired t-test N Mean (vit = 1) Mean (vit = 0) Difference p-value
Labor/Material 424610 0.172 0.154 0.018 0.000
Capital/Material 424610 0.162 0.131 0.031 0.000
Note: The table shows paired t-test results for elasticity ratios under two counterfactuals: vit = 1
∂f ∂f ∂f ∂fversus vit = 0. These elasticity ratios are (.)/ (.) and (.)/ (.) respectively.∂l ∂m ∂k ∂m
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Appendix
Table A1: Aggregate Summary Statistics (Monetary Values in Trillion RMB)
Year Number of Firms VA Sales Output Employment Export Fixed Assets (Net)
1998 165118 1.94 6.54 6.77 56.44 1.08 4.41
1999 162033 2.16 7.06 7.27 58.05 1.15 4.73
2000 162882 2.54 8.37 8.57 53.68 1.46 5.18
2001 171256 2.83 0.00 9.54 54.41 1.62 5.54
2002 181557 3.30 10.86 11.08 55.21 2.01 5.95
2003 196220 4.20 13.95 14.23 57.48 2.69 6.61
2004 279092 0.00 19.78 20.17 66.22 4.05 7.97
2005 271835 7.22 24.69 25.16 69.31 4.77 8.95
2006 301961 9.11 31.08 31.66 73.49 6.05 10.58
2007 336768 11.70 39.76 40.51 78.75 7.34 12.34
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